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approaches these questions from classical liberal, Lockeian premises. He
asks us how, if we too support these principles (the ideas which underlie
the Declaration of Independence and most of the American Credo), we
can reach other conclusions.
This is where this book, so largely theoretical, becomes a ripe subject
for scholarly legal thought. If we follow the logic of these essays, it is
imperative to reconsider many of the assumptions of our law. Is there an
implicit right, perhaps under the 9th Amendment, of the citizen to
determine his own life, absent some special overriding governmental
need? This need may, the author concedes, arise in times of national
emergency, or when individual behavior is thoroughly other-regarding.
But otherwise, the presumption would seem to be in favor of the citizen.
Yet, not exactly. For Walzer is a pluralist, a real old-fashioned one of
the Figgis-Laski type. The individual is helpless before the state, so he
must resist it or ignore it in groups, and these groups have a life of their
own. The result seems to be that, as much as Walzer has rescued from
the state, he snatches back to hand to the association. And here the
author plays favorites. Not mean old corporations or absolutist
churches, but good democratic groups. And, as much as he admires the
Black Revolution, it does not qualify either. So, like Figgis and Laski
before him, a comprehensive work of hautepolitique sometimes seems to
end up as a nifty bit of special pleading for "our" side-here, the
voluntary community of idealistic protesters. Walzer sees the problem
and apologizes for the bias, but then proceeds on his way. This is
understandable, but unfortunate, for beyond the advocacy (mixed with
sage advice) is a fine work of general theory.
JOSEPH 0. Losos*
SENTENCING: THE DECISION As To TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF
SENTENCE. By Robert 0. Dawson. ' Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1969. Pp. xxi, 424. $12.50.
The sentencing of offenders has maintained an ambivalent position in
the administration of criminal justice. Attorneys (both prosecuting and
* Member. Missouri Bar.
I Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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defending), judges, editorial writers, and legal scholars repeat such
truisms as: "sentencing is highly important;" "it is a crucially strategic
aspect of criminal justice" and "it is an awesome responsibility for the
courts." In practice, however, the participants too often fail to take
cognizance of, or act during the sentencing process as though they were
aware of the importance of sentencing. Sentencing frequently is a
callous, routine, and preemptory recitation of verbiage required before
imposing the sanctions of the law. Seldom has it been this reviewer's
privilege to witness or participate in a sentencing that could, by the most
remote defintion, be identified as the belated beginning of the
correctional process as, even in the eyes of the most punitive obserger, it
should be. What could be an occasion for a clear, candid, reasonable and
understanding explanation of the reasons for the sentence imposed, the
expectations of the court, the future of the offender, and the alternatives
available to him in the correctional system, degenerates instead into an
emotion-laden confrontation, with the offender at the mercy of a caustic
court or the recipient of maudlin platitudes.
I heartily recommend Professor Robert 0. Dawson's Sentencing: The
Decision as to Type, Length, and Conditions of Sentence. Professor
Dawson has written a fine reference book for correctional
administrators, supervisors, line staff, legislators and interested laymen
concerned with the process. But Sentencing will also be of great practical
value to counsel-especially appointed counsel-who are not familiar
with the criminal courts, and to judges who have not studied the elements
involved, the alternatives, or the goals of sentencing offenders. The
justice system will improve in almost direct ratio to recognition on the
part of the legal profession and corrections personnel that there is an
extensive gap in the orientation, training and general knowledge of our
system of criminal justice administration: to the extent that Sentencing
fills this knowledge "gap", it is a useful book.
Recognizing the limitations of time, space and manpower that held
Professor Dawson's survey to only three jurisdictions, it would appear
desirable to have included a section discussing the general application of
the data presented. Such a section might have pointed out that, as this
reviewer believes the case to be, although other jurisdictions do not
operate under identical statutory provisions, judicial or correctional
policies, or with equal resources, they would have in some form the
elements described in Professor Dawson's three-jurisdiction sample.
Issue may be taken with several statements, conclusions, and
assumptions in Sentencing. Although they do not detract appreciably
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from the principal focus of the book, some are sufficiently important to
require response.
First, I believe it specious to suggest that the courts should participate
in administering correctional programs, especially probation services.
Judges are neither trained, experienced, or especially adept at
administering their own courts; it seems unlikely that they could add any
administrative competence to correctional agencies. Current efforts to
recruit court administrators are one of the brighter lights on the criminal
justice horizon. It is the role of a court administrator to free judges for
judicial duties. There is no contradiction in supporting, on the one hand,
freeing judges of as much administrative duty as possible and urging
them, on the other, to become thoroughly familiar with, and responsive
to, all aspects of the justice system. Professor Dawson refers to both
needs, and by implication at least, appears to encourage their
development. Sentencing illustrates that, in spite of additional
procedural safeguards, where the judge is actively involved in
administering correction, the results seldom differ much. Encouraging
additional involvement by judges in correctional programs, then,
involves few gains for the offender and operates against the encouraged
freedom for the judge to concentrate on being a judge.
I am particularly impressed with Professor Dawson's emphasis on the
relationships that exist between the various elements of the justice
system. The impact of each element on the other, and on the offenders
caught up in the system, must be stated and restated. For corrections to
be effective, the correctional approach to crime prevention and control
should ultimately extend from an offender's initial contact with the
justice system-usually with the police-through his return to the
community. Police behavior can have a substantial influence on the
attitude and actions of the offender as he passes through the system.
Obviously there are limits, but the entire police process-including the
manner of arrest, taking into custody, interrogation, and
informing-can be a positive contribution to correction if the accused is
treated fairly and humanely, with as much dignity as possible, and in a
thoroughly professional manner. That kind of police practice is
encouraged by good training and supervision, and good working
conditions. The rest of the justice system should similarly operate at a
high level of professional conduct and process. Such is not now the case,
generally, at any level.
Those who work in the justice system, in an operating agency, a
planning agency or a consultative capacity, are universally committed to
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the idea that responsible, highly trained, skilled and adequately
compensated personnel in sufficient numbers are essential to develop a
system equal to the demands on it. Impoverishment is pleaded too often.
Probation and parole are both advocated as more effective and cheaper
correctional methods. This latter argument is, however, essentially
apologetic since probation and parole deal with different types of
offenders under altogether different circumstances; the true rationale
must be seen as economic. We should recognize the illogic of
encouraging use of certain correctional mechanisms solely on the basis
of their relatively low cost. The extension of that line of reasoning can
only lead to total use of the suspended sentence without supervision as
the most economical correctional method. Corrections is, as are all other
elements of the justice system, an expensive public service. The sooner
our legislators, administrators and taxpayers accept that fact, the sooner
society will support a system of effective crime prevention and control.
References in Sentencing to probation as leniency can only hinder
efforts to have probation recognized as an effective correctional
procedure to be used whenever and wherever the situation indicates it to
be the best method for specific defendants. The fact that release is more
pleasant than confinement should be incidental to a court's sentencing
decision. On the other hand, an advocate's desire to obtain leniency for
his client is not necessarily consistent with the correctionally appropriate
sentence. One of the primary reasons correctional administrators have
some apprehension about encouraging the presence of counsel in
correctional decision-making is this single-sided advocacy for leniency
for clients, whether or not appropriate.
Ideally, no defendant should be excluded from probation
consideration, and the probation department should be independent of
the court so as not to be influenced by the known views, attitudes, or
preferences of judges. The recommendations of the probation
department should be based on a professional evaluation of the
particular defendant in relation to the most effective correctional service
available, whether it is the offender's first or tenth conviction. The
information needed to make that kind of determination cannot be
developed in a post-plea of guilty hearing. The verbal ability of the
defendant and his counsel to present his side of the matter, will prevail in
all areas, except that relating to his criminal history. Proper allocution
and a competent pre-sentence investigation provide the best means for
assuring the guilt of the accused and the most appropriate sentence.
It is impossible to refrain from commenting on what Sentencing
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indicates to be the reliance of some Detroit judges, for sentencing
purposes, on psychiatric examination. Psychiatrists are not especially
well-informed about the correctional resources in a state or community.
They seldom are familiar with the social-cultural norms of the typical
offender or of his relationship with the criminal justice apparatus.
Hopefully, the report included on pages 44-45 of Sentencing is atypical
of those relied on by most courts. That report, so obviously distorted in
its evaluation and recommendation, is a disservice to the court. For
instance, "He is unstable, alcoholic, nomadic," describes a man who
worked in the same city for thirty-one years on two jobs. The
recommendation, "[b]ecause of the nature of the offense. . ." included
institutionalization with no references to the victim-precipitation aspect
of the offense.
The Model Sentencing Act would bring reason, realism and a greater
precision into the sentencing of offenders. The Act requires a much
broader use of probation and parole and relatively short term sentences
to institutions. It would end the ridiculous accumulative sentences of
hundreds of years or multiple life sentences that create the "walking
dead" in our correctional institutions. Professor Dawson refers to the
Model Sentencing Act and the Model Penal Code in a manner that I
interpret to be an endorsement of their basic methods. These methods
include a greatly expanded use of probation, relatively short maximum
sentences, and the development of a variety of correctional institutions.
Readers of Sentencing-hopefully many will be lawyer-legislators-will
readily recognize the dearth of coordination, cooperation and mutual
understanding of the sentencing process by the courts, correctional
agencies, legislatures and appellate courts. The Model Sentencing Act
provides great improvement in sentencing. Adoption of the Model Penal
Code would also be a significant advance for most states. A combination
of the best features of both proposals can provide excellent guides to
legislatures in alleviating the problems which Sentencing highlights for
the reader. 2
The message provided by Robert Dawson is clear and comprehensive
to this reviewer. It is a resounding declaration that our entire system of
criminal justice must be completely reformed: that procedures, practices,
philosophies and personnel must be related to a mutually agreed upon
2 1970 is the centennial year for the Congress of Correction. At its meeting, the Congress will
very likely adopt another set of principles even though the original ones, if followed throughout the
U ited States, would require comprehensive improvement in most correctional programs.
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set of goals. These goals, in a broad sense, include protection of the
individual in our society from personal and property loss at the hands of
any other individual who has been through the criminal justice system.
Further, that system should stop young offenders at the time of their
earliest encounter with the justice system from beginning a life sentence
"on the installment plan."
CHARLES MANN*
UPGRADING THE AMERICAN POLICE. By Charles B. Saunders, Jr.'
Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970. Pp. 172. $5.95.
It has become increasingly fashionable in recent years for everyone
from wild-eyed militants to grim-faced conservatives, from the
President's commissions to neighborhood commissions, from learned
political scientists to anyone with an "axe to grind" to offer comments
and criticisms on what are the problems facing the criminal justice
system in the United States, and particularly the field of Law
Enforcement as it relates to the "cop on the beat". No matter what the
true intention may be: political, revolutionary, patriotic, self-serving, it
is generally accepted by knowledgeable citizens and sometimes, though
grudgingly, the police themselves that Law Enforcement has been remiss
in initiating programs necessary to upgrade the police. Scholars for half
a century have recognized the crucial need for improving the quality of
the police. An attempt was made to raise the quality of police agencies in
the early 1900's, particularly by August Vollmer, Chief of Police,
Berkeley, California, who almost single-handedly was applying new
principles of organization and professionalism in the police field. It was
not until crime in the streets became a selling point for politicians, recent
Supreme Court decisions became a matter of controversy, the total ills
of present society raised their ugly heads and with the drastically overdue
awakening within the Law Enforcement field, that it became apparent to
the average citizen of our country that the state of the art of police work
was antiquated, under-staffed, under-educated, under-trained, and
under-budgeted.
* Executive Director, St. Louis Bureau for Men.
1. Assistant to the President, Brookings Institution.
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